Freedom of speech and access to social media: Packingham v North Carolina

Authors

  • Alejandro Francisco Herran, Dr. Universidad Autónoma de Chiapas

Abstract

In its decision in Packingham v North Carolina, the Supreme Court of the United States found a North Carolina law that barred registered sex offenders from ac- cessing commercial social networking web sites (social media) as unconstitutional, be- cause of the law’s overbroad restriction of lawful first amendment speech. This comment analyzes the details of the constitutional review by the Supreme Court, reviewing the general criteria used in such reviews, using the arguments presented in the case. It also briefly considers the possible consequences of the decision.

Keywords:

Freedom of speech, social networks, internet, First Amendment

Author Biography

Alejandro Francisco Herran, Dr., Universidad Autónoma de Chiapas

Doctor en Derecho por el Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la Universidad Autónoma de Chiapas, México. Maestro en Administración por la Universidad del Valle de México. Licenciado en Derecho por la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Profesor investigador de tiempo completo de la Universidad Autónoma de Chiapas, adscrito al Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas.

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